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Abstract—Ride-sharing or vehicle-pooling allows commuters
to team up spontaneously for transportation cost sharing. This
has become a popular trend in the emerging paradigm of sharing
economy. One crucial component to support effective ride-sharing
is the matching mechanism that pairs up suitable commuters.
Traditionally, matching has been performed in a centralized
manner, whereby an operator arranges ride-sharing according
to a global objective (e.g., total cost of all commuters). However,
ride-sharing is a decentralized decision-making paradigm, where
commuters are self-interested and only motivated to team up
based on individual payments. Particularly, it is not clear how
transportation cost should be shared fairly between commuters,
and what ramifications of cost-sharing are on decentralized ride-
sharing. This paper sheds light on the principles of decentralized
ride-sharing and vehicle-pooling mechanisms based on stable
matching, such that no one would be better off to deviate
from a stable matching outcome. We study various fair cost-
sharing mechanisms and the induced stable matching outcomes.
We compare the stable matching outcomes with a social optimal
outcome (that minimizes total cost) by theoretical bounds of social
optimality ratios, and show that several fair cost-sharing mecha-
nisms can achieve high social optimality. We also corroborate our
results with an empirical study of taxi sharing under fair cost-
sharing mechanisms by a data analysis on New York City taxi
trip dataset, and provide useful insights on effective decentralized
mechanisms for practical ride-sharing and vehicle-pooling.
Index Terms—Ride-Sharing; Vehicle-Pooling; Decentralized
Coalition Formation, Fair Cost-Sharing Mechanisms; Stable
Matching
I. INTRODUCTION
There is an increasing notion of shareability in transporta-
tion systems. The popular trend of on-demand ride-hailing
services (e.g., Uber, Lyft and Didi) allows commuters to
arrange chauffeured vehicle services conveniently on online
platforms. Certain ride-hailing platforms also provide sharing
services among multiple commuters (e.g., UberPool, Lyft Line,
Didi Hitch). Sharing rides is a prominent example of sharing
economy [1], which promotes economic sharing activities in a
peer-to-peer manner. Furthermore, worldwide governments are
introducing policies to encourage vehicle-pooling [2]. Private
vehicles are often occupied by single passengers. Vehicle-
pooling is an effective solution to improve traffic congestion,
air quality and parking availability.
Despite the promising benefits, it is not clear whether com-
muters will be motivated to adopt ride-sharing and vehicle-
pooling themselves. While there have been extensive studies
[3] suggesting a significant reduction in the total transportation
cost by centralized ride-sharing arrangement, it is unlikely that
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commuters will conform to centralized arrangement without
considering their individual payments. In particular, ride-
sharing is a decentralized decision-making paradigm. Com-
muters are often self-interested and only motivated to team up
with each other based on individual objectives. Also, many ex-
isting commercial ride-hailing service platforms are restricted
to matching commuters with similar trips. Matching non-
collocated commuters is significantly more challenging. This
paper sheds light on how decentralized mechanisms should
be designed to support effective ride-sharing and vehicle
pooling among non-collocated commuters. We aim to provide
the theoretical foundation for decentralized mechanisms, as
a departure from the centralized and restrictive mechanisms
provided in nowadays ride-hailing service platforms.
To illustrate the concept of decentralized ride-sharing ar-
rangement process, we provide an example1 in Fig. 1. First, the
commuters will post their trip information and time constraints
on an open data repository (e.g., a social network or an open
ledger like blockchain). Then, the commuters will identify
potential ride-sharing partners and plan the possible shared
rides with transportation costs. The commuters will also com-
pute their individual payments by splitting the transportation
costs in a certain fair manner. Next, the commuters will
propose to potential ride-sharing partners according to the
ranking order of individual payments. By a proper matching
mechanism, they will reach a mutual agreement, such that no
better rides can be arranged otherwise. Note that this process
is not dictated by a centralized operator. Each commuter is
free to accept or reject any ride-sharing proposals.
In particular, we highlight three key elements in decentral-
ized ride-sharing arrangement:
A. Fair Cost-Sharing Mechanisms
Central to decentralized ride-sharing arrangement is a com-
monly agreed cost-sharing mechanism for splitting the trans-
portation costs among the parties of ride-sharing. The choice
of cost-sharing mechanisms should take into consideration of
fair contribution of each party, which provides a rationale on
how to split the cost of a sharable ride in a fair manner. In
particular, commuters may not share the same destinations
or sources. There are a variety of possible fair cost-sharing
mechanisms. For example, one simple cost-sharing mechanism
is to split the the transportation cost equally between two
parties. Another way is to split proportionally according to
1This ride-sharing arrangement process can be operated as a standalone
services, along with any ride-hailing platforms (like Uber or taxis).
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2Fig. 1: An illustration of decentralized ride-sharing arrange-
ment process.
the original costs of standalone rides. Also, one may consider
to split in a way to induce equal savings from standalone
rides. Note that the choices of cost-sharing mechanisms will
affect individual commuters’ preferential orders of possible
ride-sharing options and the outcome of an agreement. Given
multiple choices of cost-sharing mechanisms, it is important
to understand their ramifications on ride-sharing agreement.
B. Stable Matching
Based on individual commuters’ preferential orders of possi-
ble ride-sharing options, a decentralized matching mechanism
is needed to arrange ride-sharing. In practice, commuters
usually form a coalition as a pair to share a ride, as this
reduces the complexity of reaching an agreement. Matching
mechanisms have been studied in various applications, such as
college admissions and dating [4]. One useful concept is stable
matching, which is particularly desirable in decentralized
decision-making mechanisms, because no participants would
be better off to deviate from a stable matching outcome.
Hence, stable matching captures the likely outcome of an
agreement in a decentralized matching process. But different
cost-sharing mechanisms will induce different stable matching
outcomes. In this paper, we compare stable matching outcomes
under different fair cost-sharing mechanisms in ride-sharing
arrangement.
C. Social Optimality
To compare different cost-sharing mechanisms for ride-
sharing arrangement, a natural approach is to benchmark
against a social optimal outcome that minimizes the to-
tal transportation cost of all commuters. Decentralized ride-
sharing arrangement will not reach a social optimal outcome,
because everyone is self-interested to minimize his individual
cost, rather than the total cost. However, a good cost-sharing
mechanism should achieve high social optimality. We measure
the ratio between the cost of a stable matching outcome over
the one of a social optimal outcome. In this paper, we present
theoretical bounds on the social optimality ratios for various
fair cost-sharing mechanisms, which then show high social
optimality in these cost-sharing mechanisms. To corroborate
our theoretical study, we also present a data analysis on prac-
tical taxi sharing in New York City. We compare the empirical
social optimality of various fair cost-sharing mechanisms used
in taxi sharing by an extensive study based on NYC taxi trip
dataset [5].
Outline: This paper presents an extensive study of how de-
centralized mechanisms can support effective ride-sharing. We
first present a brief survey on the related literature in Sec. II.
The model and notations of cost-sharing mechanisms and
stable matching are formulated in Secs. III-IV. We compare
the social optimality of various fair cost-sharing mechanisms
by theoretical bounds in Sec. V. We also present a modified
stable matching algorithm for finding a stable ride-sharing
assignment in Sec. VI. To corroborate our theoretical study,
we present an empirical data analysis on practical taxi sharing
in New York City in Sec. VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Ride-sharing research belongs to a large body of literature
(e.g., see a survey in [2]). There are various paradigms
of ride-sharing among commuters, or between drivers and
passengers. For example, see a survey in [6]. One of the critical
components in ride-sharing is the matching process that pairs
commuters to share a ride, or finding suitable drivers for the
requested passengers [7]–[13].
In particular, the studies in [3], [14] investigated how
ride-sharing and vehicle pooling can reduce transportation
delay. These papers generally assume that ride-sharing and
vehicle pooling is arranged by centralized entities to achieve
the desirable benefits. There is no consideration of the self-
interested nature of commuters who will not always follow
centralized arrangement. On the other hand, there are recent
papers considering stable matching in ride-sharing [7]–[9].
However, the motivation of stable matching in these papers is
related to arbitrary passengers’ or drivers’ preferences about
each other, which is not necessarily related to cost-sharing
of transportation costs. [10]–[13] consider stable matching
between drivers and passengers, but do not consider sharing
transportation cost among the passengers. Also, these papers
did not compare stable matching with social optimal ride-
sharing arrangements in the context of sharing transportation
cost among commuters.
Ride-sharing belongs to the general topic of transportation
scheduling. Scheduling algorithms for ride-sharing have been
investigated in other studies [15], [16], where a scheduler
optimizes a ride to pick up and drop off multiple passengers
at different locations. While optimization of ride is outside
the scope of the paper, the scheduling algorithms can be
incorporated in the matching algorithm to arrange the best
shared rides among a given set of commuters.
Our study of fair cost-sharing mechanisms for ride-sharing
belongs to the broad topic of network cost-sharing and coali-
tion formation problems [17]–[20]. A study related to our
3TABLE I: Table of key symbols and notations.
Symbol Definition
Groad = (Vroad, Eroad) ◦ Graph representing road network
N -Set of commuters participating in ride-sharing
(vsi , v
d
i , t
s
i , t
d
i ) ◦ Source and destination locations, and earliest
departure and latest arrival times of i ∈ N
Ri,j ◦ Set of sharable rides for i, j ∈ N satisfying
feasibility constraints
rselfi ◦ Standalone ride of i ∈ N not shared with othersGmatch = (N , Ematch) ◦Matching graph, where (i, j) ∈ Ematch has non-
empty Ri,j and (i, i) ∈ Ematch for all i ∈ N
rmini,j ◦ Minimum cost sharable ride in Ri,j
ci,j , c(rmini,j ) ◦ Cost of shared ride rmini,j for i, j ∈ N
ci,i , c(rselfi ) ◦ Cost of standalone ride rselfi for i ∈ N
pi(r) ◦Payment from i for shared ride r based on a cost-
sharing mechanism
ui(r) , c(rselfi )− pi(r) ◦ Utility of i for of shared ride rM ◦ Feasible ride-sharing assignment, a subset of
Ematch satisfying the feasibility properties
c(M) ,∑(i,j)∈M ci,j ◦ Social cost of ride-sharing assignment M
c(Mˆ)
c(M∗) ◦ Social optimality ratio between a stable ride-
sharing assignment (Mˆ) and a social optimal ride-
sharing assignment (M∗)
results is the strong price of anarchy for stable matching [21].
Our ride-sharing matching problem is a subclass of coalition
formation games [22] that allows arbitrary coalitions with at
most two participants per coalition. However, our results are
based on social optimality ratio, which is different than the
previous studies. The results of social optimality ratio in this
work can be derived in a general setting in [23]–[26]. But
we simplify the proofs by considering a coalition as pairs in
the context of ride-sharing. Furthermore, we corroborate our
theoretical study by an empirical data analysis of practical taxi
sharing in New York City.
The New York City taxi trip dataset is a large publicly
available dataset [5], which provides detailed records of pick-
up and drop-off locations and times in New York City. The
dataset can enable a wide range of empirical studies of
taxi service strategy optimization [27]. There have been a
number of studies about taxi sharing in the literature based
on New York City taxi trip dataset [3], [14]. But none of the
previous studies considered decentralized stable matching for
taxi sharing using New York City taxi trip dataset.
III. MODEL AND NOTATIONS
This section presents a general model of ride-sharing by
matching commuters for sharing hired vehicles2. Table I lists
some key notations. Consider a road network represented by
a directed graph Groad = (Vroad, Eroad), where Vroad is a set
of road junctions and Eroad is a set of road segments. There
is a set of commuters N . Each commuter i ∈ N is associated
with a tuple of parameters (vsi , v
d
i , t
s
i , t
d
i ), where v
s
i ∈ Vroad is
the source location, vdi ∈ Vroad is the destination location, tsi
is the earliest departure time, and tdi is the latest arrival time.
Our goal is to pair up the commuters for potential ride-sharing.
2In practice, the matching process may be carried out on an online platform
automated by computer agents representing the users.
A. Sharable Rides
Given road network Groad, a ride r is defined by a sequence
of locations (vr1, ..., v
r
l , ..., v
r
m), where each v
r
j ∈ Vroad, and
a sequence of arrival times (tr1, ..., t
r
l , ..., t
r
m), where t
r
l is the
arrival time at location vrl . For each v ∈ {vr1, ..., vrm}, we
denote tr(v) as the arrival time of ride r at location v.
Definition 1: (Sharable Ride) A ride r is sharable by a pair
i, j ∈ N , if the following feasibility constraints are satisfied:
1) (Location Constraint): (vsi , v
d
i , v
s
j , v
d
j ) are in the se-
quence of locations of ride r. Namely, vsi , v
d
i , v
s
j , v
d
j ∈
{vr1, ..., vrm}.
2) (Temporal Constraint for i): tsi ≤ tr(vsi ) < tr(vdi ) ≤ tdi .
3) (Temporal Constraint for j): tsj ≤ tr(vsj) < tr(vdj ) ≤ tdj .
Given (i, j), there are two types of sharable rides:
1) Hitchhiking Ride: A ride r is called an (i; j)-hitchhiking
ride, if tr(vsj) < t
r(vsi ) < t
r(vdi ) < t
r(vdj ).
2) Combined Ride: A ride r is called an (i; j)-combined
ride, if tr(vsi ) < t
r(vsj) < t
r(vdi ) < t
r(vdj ).
A sharable ride for (i, j) can either be (i; j)-hitchhiking, (j; i)-
hitchhiking, (i; j)-combined, or (j; i)-combined. For example,
in Fig. 2 (b), (i, k) shares (i; k)-hitchhiking ride. In Fig. 2 (c),
(i, j) shares (i; j)-combined ride.
In this paper, we consider the matching of pairs of com-
muters, who have declared their requests in advance, barring
cancellation. Also, we consider the cost of transportation as
the primary factor to ride-sharing decisions. However, the
model can be extended by incorporating additional constraints
in the matching process. Given a ride r, let c(r) be the
associated transportation cost, which will be the fare of a
taxi or hired vehicle. Let Ri,j be the set of sharable rides
in road network Groad for a pair of distinct commuters (i, j),
and rmini,j , argminr∈Ri,j c(r) be the minimum cost sharable
ride in Ri,j , which is the ride of minimum cost among all
sharable rides between i, j. Let rselfi be the standalone ride
for commuter i if i does not share with another commuter.
Note that c(rmini,j ) ≥ max{c(rselfi ), c(rselfj )}. Otherwise, the
commuter (i or j) can always choose another lower cost
standalone ride.
B. Matching for Ride-Sharing
Matching for ride-sharing can be attained by an undirected
matching graph Gmatch = (N , Ematch) where Ematch ,
{(i, j) : Ri,j 6= ∅} ∪ {(i, i) : i ∈ N}. Namely, Ematch
includes two types of edges: (1) (i, j) represents a sharable
ride with a pair of distinct commuters, and (2) (i, i) represents
a standalone ride. Let ci,j , c(rmini,j ) and ci,i , c(rselfi ) be the
edge costs of edges (i, j) and (i, i), respectively.
Definition 2: (Feasible Ride-Sharing) Given matching
graph Gmatch, we define a feasible ride-sharing assignment
as a subset of edges M ⊆ Ematch satisfying the following
feasibility properties:
1) Every i ∈ N is covered by an edge inM. Namely, there
exists (i, j) ∈M or (i, i) ∈M for every i ∈ N .
2) No pair of edges inM share any nodes. Namely, there do
not exist (i, j) ∈M and (i, k) ∈M\{(i, j)} for i ∈ N .
4Fig. 2: An example of ride-sharing assignments. M1 =
{(i, k), (j, l)} is social optimum. M1 is stable under egalitar-
ian and proportional cost-sharing mechanisms (to be defined
in Sec. IV), whereas M2 = {(i, j), (k), (l)} is stable under
equal and segment-based cost-sharing mechanisms.
Definition 3: (Socially Optimal Ride-Sharing) Given a
feasible ride-sharing assignment M, let the social cost be
c(M) , ∑(i,j)∈M ci,j . A feasible ride-sharing assignment
is called a social optimum (denoted by M∗), if it minimizes
the total transportation cost:
min
M:M is feasible
c(M)
A ride-sharing assignment M can also be equivalently
represented by a binary vector x = (xi,j)(i,j)∈Ematch , where
each binary variable xi,j ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether the pair of
commuters (i, j) will share a ride. Note that finding a social
optimal ride-sharing assignment is equivalent to solving the
following minimum weight edge covering problem:
min
x
∑
(i,j)∈Ematch
ci,jxi,j
subject to
∑
j∈N
xi,j ≥ 1, for all i ∈ N (1)
xi,j ∈ {0, 1}, for all (i, j) ∈ Ematch (2)
Constraints (1)-(2) ensure the feasibility of ride-sharing as-
signment.
Example: We consider an example of road network in Fig. 2
(a). There are four commuters {i, j, k, l}. For commuter i, his
sources location is denoted by vsi and destination location by
vsj . The number on each edge represents the transportation cost
of the respective segment. In this example, the social optimal
ride-sharing assignment is M1 = {(i, k), (j, l)} with social
cost c(M1) = 14, as illustrated in Fig. 2 (b).
IV. DECENTRALIZED RIDE-SHARING MECHANISMS
Note that ride-sharing is a decentralized decision-making
paradigm. It is unlikely that every commuter will follow a
ride-sharing assignment according to the social cost. In reality,
commuters are self-interested and only motivated to team up
with each other based on individual savings. It is natural to
consider how individual commuter will decide in arranging
ride-sharing among themselves.
A. Fair Cost-Sharing Mechanisms
Consider a sharable ride r for a pair of commuters (i, j).
There are many ways to split to cost c(r) among (i, j) in a
fair manner. A cost-sharing mechanism is defined by payment
function pi(·), which is the payment by commuter i for ride r.
A budget-balanced cost-sharing mechanism requires pi(r) +
pj(r) = c(r). We also let the utility (i.e., saving) of commuter
i for ride r be ui(r) = c(rselfi ) − pi(r), where rselfi is the
standalone ride for commuter i.
A fair cost-sharing mechanism should provide a rationale on
how to split the cost of a sharable ride in a fair manner. There
are several fair and budget-balanced cost-sharing mechanisms
(denoted by different superscripts in pi(·)) as follows:
1) (Equal Cost-Sharing): Each commuter should split c(r)
equally.
peqi (r) =
c(r)
2
(3)
Note that equal cost-sharing mechanism may produce
negative utility (ueqi (r) < 0).
2) (Egalitarian Cost-Sharing): Each commuter should split
c(r) in a way to attain the same utility.
pegai (r) =
c(r) + c(rselfi )− c(rselfj )
2
(4)
Namely, uegai (r) = u
ega
j (r) =
c(rselfi )+c(r
self
j )−c(r)
2
3) (Proportional Cost-Sharing): Each commuter should
contribute proportionally to the cost of standalone ride.
pppi (r) =
c(rselfi ) · c(r)
c(rselfi ) + c(r
self
j )
(5)
4) (Segment-based Cost-Sharing): Each commuter should
only contribute to the participated segments of ride. Let
the transportation cost of the segment from v1 to v2 in
ride r be cr(v1, v2).
• If r is an (i; j)-hitchhiking ride, then
psbi (r) =
cr(v
s
i , v
d
i )
2
(6)
psbj (r) = cr(v
s
j , v
s
i ) +
cr(v
s
i , v
d
i )
2
+ cr(v
d
i , v
d
j ) (7)
• If r is an (i; j)-combined ride, then
psbi (r) = cr(v
s
i , v
s
j) +
cr(v
s
j , v
d
i )
2
(8)
psbj (r) =
cr(v
s
j , v
d
i )
2
+ cr(v
d
i , v
d
j ) (9)
Each of these fair cost-sharing mechanisms captures a
notion of fair contribution from the involved commuters.
Different fair cost-sharing mechanisms will induce different
outcomes in decentralized ride-sharing arrangement. We next
investigate the impacts of these fair cost-sharing mechanisms.
In the following, we consider the sharable ride for each pair pf
commuters (i, j) to be the minimum cost sharable ride rmini,j .
5B. Stable Ride-Sharing Assignment
Given a cost-sharing mechanism, any pair of commuters
may join to share a ride based on individual payments.
Every commuter aims to minimize his individual payment.
We consider any unilateral switch that allows any pair of
commuters abandon their current rides to create another ride.
As a consequence, a stable assignment is likely to emerge,
such that no one would be better off to deviate from the current
assignment.
Definition 4: (Stable Ride-Sharing) Given payment func-
tion pi(·), a pair of commuters (i, j) is called a blocking
pair with respect to ride-sharing assignment M if i and j
can strictly reduce their payments when they form a pair
(i, j) to share a ride instead of the respective rides in M.
A feasible ride-sharing assignment Mˆ is called stable ride-
sharing assignment, if there exists no blocking pair with
respect to Mˆ. Stable ride-sharing assignment is based on the
concept of stable coalition in cooperative game theory [23].
A stable ride-sharing assignment is equivalent to a stable
matching outcome (with the inclusion of possibly singleton
groups for standalone commuters). Note that a stable ride-
sharing assignment is also a strong Nash equilibrium in game
theory [23]. A strong Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium,
in which no group of players can cooperatively deviate in an
allowable way that benefits all of its members, whereas a Nash
equilibrium only allows a player to make a unilateral action.
Some previous papers (e.g., [10]) studied Nash equilibrium
the matching in ride-sharing, but not strong Nash equilibrium.
Definition 5: (Social Optimality Ratio) Define the social
optimality ratio as the ratio between the cost of a stable ride-
sharing assignment (Mˆ) and that of a social optimal ride-
sharing assignment (M∗) for a particular instance of ride-
sharing problem by
c(Mˆ)
c(M∗) (10)
If the social optimality ratio is small for a particular cost-
sharing mechanism, then such a cost-sharing mechanism can
achieve high social optimality by inducing a stable ride-sharing
assignment close to a social optimum.
eq ega pp sb
pi(r
min
i,j ) 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25
pj(r
min
i,j ) 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25
pi(r
min
i,k ) 3.5 3 3.11 2
pk(r
min
i,k ) 3.5 4 3.89 5
pj(r
min
j,l ) 3.5 3 3.11 2
pl(r
min
j,l ) 3.5 4 3.89 5
stable ride-sharing M2 M1 M1 M2
c(rselfi ) c(r
self
j ) c(r
self
k ) c(r
self
l )
4 4 4.9 4.9
TABLE II: Individual payments based on different cost-sharing
mechanisms (eq, ega, pp, sb) and the costs of standalone rides
for the example in Fig. 2.
Example: We consider the road network in Fig. 2 (a).
Table II shows the individual payments based on equal (eq),
egalitarian (ega), proportional (pp), and segment-based (sb)
cost-sharing mechanisms for commuters {i, j, k, l}, and the
costs of standalone rides. The stable ride-sharing assignments
for different cost-sharing mechanisms are derived as follows:
1) (Equal Cost-Sharing): We obtain
peqi (r
min
i,j ) < p
eq
i (r
min
i,k ) < c(r
self
i ) (11)
peqj (r
min
i,j ) < p
eq
j (r
min
j,l ) < c(r
self
j ) (12)
Hence, (i, j) will be motivated to share a ride instead of
other options. Then, the stable ride-sharing assignment is
M2 = {(i, j), (k), (l)} and the social optimality ratio is
1.16.
2) (Egalitarian Cost-Sharing): We obtain
pegai (r
min
i,k ) < p
ega
i (r
min
i,j ) < c(r
self
i ) (13)
pegak (r
min
i,k ) < c(r
self
k ) (14)
pegaj (r
min
j,l ) < p
ega
j (r
min
i,j ) < c(r
self
j ) (15)
pegal (r
min
j,l ) < c(r
self
l ) (16)
Hence, (i, k) and (j, l) will be motivated to share rides
respectively. The stable ride-sharing assignment isM1 =
{(i, k), (j, l)} and the social optimality ratio is 1.
3) (Proportional Cost-Sharing): Similar to egalitarian cost-
sharing, the stable ride-sharing assignment is M1 =
{(i, k), (j, l)} and the social optimality ratio is 1.
4) (Segment-based Cost-Sharing): We obtain
c(rselfk ) < p
sb
k (r
min
i,k ) (17)
c(rselfl ) < p
sb
l (r
min
j,l ) (18)
psbi (r
min
i,k ) < p
sb
i (r
min
i,j ) < c(r
self
i ) (19)
psbj (r
min
j,l ) < p
sb
j (r
min
i,j ) < c(r
self
j ) (20)
Hence, k and l will be motivated to remain standalone
rides, and then (i, j) will share a ride. The stable ride-
sharing assignment is M2 = {(i, j), (k), (l)} and the
social optimality ratio is 1.16.
Remark: In the preceding example, egalitarian and propor-
tional cost-sharing mechanisms can induce a social optimal
stable ride-sharing assignment. But in general, different stable
ride-sharing assignments will be induced by different cost-
sharing mechanisms. It is crucial to understand the social
optimality ratios of different cost-sharing mechanisms. In
Sec. V, we provide theoretical upper bounds on the social
optimality ratios, which shows that several fair cost-sharing
mechanisms can achieve high social optimality.
V. BOUNDS ON SOCIAL OPTIMALITY RATIO
Given any feasible ride-sharing assignment M ⊆ Ematch,
let the set of commuters present in M be N (M) , {i ∈
N : (i, j) ∈ M}. For i ∈ N (M), let the payment of i with
respect to M be pi(M) = pi(rmini,j ), where (i, j) ∈ M. In
the following, we provide general theories to upper bound the
social optimality ratio ( c(Mˆ)c(M∗) ) between the cost of a stable
ride-sharing assignment (Mˆ) and that of a social optimal ride-
sharing assignment (M∗) for any instances of problem. In
Sec. VII, we will corroborate our theoretical results with an
empirical data analysis on taxi sharing in New York City.
6Theorem 1: For equal cost-sharing mechanism, let Mˆeq
be a stable ride-sharing assignment. We show that the social
optimality ratio is upper bounded by c(Mˆ
eq)
c(M∗) ≤ 32 .
Proof: First, we assume that Mˆeq 6= M∗. Otherwise,
3
2 ≥ 1 = c(Mˆ
eq)
c(M∗) . Suppose (i, j) ∈ Mˆeq\M∗. Then there
must exist (i, k) and (j, l), such that (i, k), (j, l) ∈M∗\Mˆeq,
because all commuters must belong to some sharable rides in
Mˆeq and M∗, and both Mˆeq and M∗ are feasible.
We assume that i 6= k and j 6= l. Note that the cases of i = k
or j = l can be proven straightforwardly. Recall ci,j , c(rmini,j )
and ci,i , c(rselfi ). Since (i, k), (j, l) ∈M∗, we obtain
peqi (M∗)+peqj (M∗)+peqk (M∗)+peql (M∗) = ci,k+cj,l (21)
On the other hand, since Mˆeq is a stable ride-sharing
assignment, we obtain
peqi (Mˆeq) + peqj (Mˆeq) = ci,j , (22)
peqk (Mˆeq) ≤ ck, peql (Mˆeq) ≤ cl (23)
Hence, it follows that
peqi (Mˆeq)+peqj (Mˆeq)+peqk (Mˆeq)+peql (Mˆeq) ≤ ci,j+ck+cl
(24)
Because Mˆeq is a stable ride-sharing assignment and noting
that i 6= k and j 6= l, we obtain
ci,j
2 = p
eq
i (Mˆeq) ≤ peqi (M∗) = ci,k2 ⇒ ci,j ≤ ci,k (25)
ci,j
2 = p
eq
j (Mˆeq) ≤ peqj (M∗) = cj,l2 ⇒ ci,j ≤ cj,l (26)
Together, by noting that ci,k ≥ max{ci, ck} and cj,l ≥
max{cj , cl}, we obtain
3
(
peqi (M∗) + peqj (M∗) + peqk (M∗) + peql (M∗)
)
= 3(ci,k + cj,l) (27)
≥ ci,k + cj,l + ck + cl + ck + cl (28)
≥ 2(ci,j + ck + cl) (29)
≥ 2(peqi (Mˆeq) + peqj (Mˆeq) + peqk (Mˆeq) + peql (Mˆeq))
(30)
When i = k (or j = l), Eqn. (30) can also be proven
straightforwardly, by omitting k (or l, respectively).
Since equal cost-sharing mechanism is budget-balanced,
c(M) =∑i∈M peqi (M), summing over Mˆeq\M∗ can obtain
3 · c(M∗) ≥ 2 · c(Mˆeq) (31)
Theorem 2: For egalitarian cost-sharing mechanism, let
Mˆega be a stable ride-sharing assignment. We show that the
social optimality ratio is upper bounded by c(Mˆ
ega)
c(M∗) ≤ 32 .
Theorem 3: For proportional cost-sharing mechanism, let
Mˆpp be a stable ride-sharing assignment. We show that the
social optimality ratio is upper bounded by c(Mˆ
pp)
c(M∗) ≤ 32 .
Theorem 4: For segment-based cost-sharing mechanism, let
Mˆsb be a stable ride-sharing assignment. The corresponding
social optimality ratio is upper bounded by c(Mˆ
sb)
c(M∗) ≤ 32 .
The proofs of Theorems 2-4 can be found in the appendix.
Remark: Theorems 1-4 show that the social optimality
ratios under equal, egalitarian, proportional and segment-based
cost-sharing mechanisms are at most 32 in any instances of any
number of commuters, which is a small constant. Therefore,
these fair cost-sharing mechanisms can achieve high social
optimality. Note that in practice, the social optimality ratios
are much smaller than the theoretical bounds, and hence, can
achieve even higher social optimality.
VI. STABLE MATCHING ALGORITHM
To complement our analysis of stable matching on ride-
sharing, we present a modified stable matching algorithm
for finding a stable ride-sharing assignment. This algorithm
is based on the classical Gale-Shapley algorithm for stable
marriage problem and Irving’s algorithm for stable roommates
problem [4]. Here, we extend the classical algorithms to allow
the possibility of standalone rides (namely, with no ride-
sharing partner). The modified stable matching algorithm will
be used in Sec. VII for an empirical data analysis on taxi
sharing in New York City.
We first define some notations. For each i ∈ N , define
a preferential order (i) over all possible options of ride-
sharing pairs with i (including standalone ride). For example,
“(i, j) i (i, k) i (i, i) i ...” means that (i, j) is the
most preferred by i, then followed by (i, k) and standalone
ride (i, i), and so on. Each commuter’s preferential order
is formulated according to the ranking order of individual
payments of a given cost-sharing mechanism (e.g., pi(rmini,j ) <
pi(r
min
i,k ) < pi(r
self
i ) < ...). For equal payments, we will en-
force deterministic tie-breaking in a consistent manner across
all commuters. Note that the preferential orders also include
the option of standalone ride rselfi . Each commuter will remove
the options of ride-sharing below the standalone ride, as they
will not be selected at the end.
The stable matching algorithm is consisted of several
rounds. Initially, all commuters are set to be unsuspended,
which allows them to propose to any partners. In each round,
first each unsuspended commuter i will propose to a ride-
sharing partner he prefers most in his preferential order to
whom i has not proposed in the previous round, and is
better than the partner with whom i is currently provisionally
matched, if any. Note that for a standalone ride, i will propose
to himself. Next, each commuter j will collect a number of
proposals at each round. He will select the most preferred
one from the received proposals. If commuter j is currently
provisionally matched with, say l, and j prefers another new
proposer i to l, then (j, l) will be unmatched and (i, j) will
be provisionally matched, instead. This process will continue
until every commuter is provisionally matched with another
ride-sharing partner.
The pseudo-code of stable matching algorithm is described
in STABLEMATCHING.
Next, we define a cyclic preference as a sequence of
commuters (i1, ..., is), such that
(i1, is) i1 (i1, i2), (i1, i2) i2 (i2, i3), . . . , (is−1, is) is (i1, is)
(32)
7Algorithm 1 STABLEMATCHING
Input: Preferential orders (i)i∈N
Output: Ride-sharing assignment M
1: Initialize ∀i ∈ N to be UNSUSPENDED
2: while ∃ UNSUSPENDED i who still has a potential ride-
sharing partner to propose do
3: j ← first potential partner on i’s preferential order to
whom i has not yet proposed
4: Suppose (i, k) PROVISIONALLY MATCHED
5: if i prefers j to k (i.e., (i, j) i (i, k)) then
6: i proposes to j
7: if j is not PROVISIONALLY MATCHED then
8: (i, j) is PROVISIONALLY MATCHED
9: Set i to be SUSPENDED
10: else
11: if ∃ (j, l) PROVISIONALLY MATCHED then
12: if j prefers i to l (i.e., (i, j) j (j, l)) then
13: Set l to UNSUSPENDED
14: (i, j) is PROVISIONALLY MATCHED
15: (j, l) is UNMATCHED
16: else
17: (j, l) still PROVISIONALLY MATCHED
18: end if
19: end if
20: end if
21: end if
22: end while
23: Set M to include all PROVISIONALLY MATCHED pairs
Theorem 5: If there exists no cyclic preference, then STA-
BLEMATCHING will converge to a stable matching outcome.
The full proof of existence of stable matching outcome
under the condition of no cyclic preference can be found in
[23]. The basic idea is that the absence of cyclic preference
rules out the possibility of oscillation, where commuters keep
switching matched pairs without termination. Note that there
is no cyclic preference under equal, egalitarian and propor-
tional cost-sharing mechanisms, as shown in [23]. Although
segment-based cost-sharing mechanism may induce cyclic
preference, this is uncommon in practice.
Although STABLEMATCHING is an extension of the classi-
cal matching algorithm from Irving [4], there are some subtle
differences in our algorithm. First, our algorithm allows any
commuter to be unmatched (and hence taking a standalone ride
by himself). Second, Theorem 5 shows that the common fair
cost-sharing mechanisms will induce no cyclic preferences.
Hence, there is no need to deal with cyclic preferences by
considering odd rotations in the original Irving’s algorithm.
VII. EMPIRICAL DATA ANALYSIS OF TAXI SHARING
To corroborate our theoretical results of social optimality
ratios in Sec. VII, we present an empirical big data analysis on
practical taxi sharing in New York City. We compare various
properties of different fair cost-sharing mechanisms used for
taxi sharing in an empirical study based on New York City
(a) Density maps of pick-up locations. The green dots indicate the pick-
up locations of matched commuters, whereas the red dots indicate those
of unmatched commuters.
(b) Distributions of total separation distance in pick-up locations between
pairs of matched commuters.
Fig. 3: (a) Density maps of the pick-up locations, and (b)
distributions of total separation distance between matched
commuters based on different cost-sharing mechanisms and
social optimum.
taxi trip dataset. We provide useful insights on effective cost-
sharing mechanisms for ride-sharing in practice.
In our data analysis, we used the taxi trip dataset of New
York City (NYC) of 2013 [5]. The dataset contains over 450K
taxi trips per day with the average distance per trip is around
4.2 km. Each data record of a trip includes the information of
Taxi ID, trip distance and duration times of pick-ups and drop-
offs of commuters as well as the GPS locations of pick-ups
and drop-offs of commuters.
A. Density Maps of Matched Commuters
Setting: We first present a case study of the effectiveness
of equal, proportional, egalitarian and segment-based cost-
sharing mechanisms, as compared to the social optimal out-
come. We consider the taxi trips during 12pm-1pm on 23th Feb
82013 (weekend) with over 5000 taxi trips. We employed the
modified stable matching algorithm in Sec. VI to find stable
ride-sharing assignments. We consider a pair of commuters
who can be potentially matched, if their pick-up times in the
NYC dataset are within 3 minutes with each other. We examine
the properties of matched and unmatched commuters in stable
matching outcomes in Fig. 3a. We compare the outcomes
with the social optimal outcome, which minimizes the total
cost of all commuters. We also examine the distributions of
total separation distance in pick-up locations between pairs of
matched commuters in Fig. 3b.
Observations: To visualize the outcomes of ride-sharing,
we plot five density maps of pick-up locations of commuters
in Fig. 3a. Not all commuters can be matched for ride-sharing.
Some of them have standalone rides. The green dots indicate
the pick-up locations of matched commuters, whereas the red
dots indicate those of unmatched commuters.
We observe that the density maps of different cost-sharing
mechanisms are rather similar, and most of the pick-up lo-
cations of matched commuters are located in similar places.
However, the portions of matched commuters are different.
Over 70% of commuters can be matched based on any of the
four cost-sharing mechanisms. However, equal and segment-
based cost-sharing mechanisms can match a fewer number of
commuters (27%-30%) than proportional and egalitarian cost-
sharing mechanisms (22%-23%), which are fewer than the
social optimal outcome (14%). Since equal cost-sharing mech-
anism can induce negative utility, it may discourage sharing
between commuters, and lead to lower percentage of matched
pairs. On the other hand, social optimal matching ignores
stability in matching, and hence can match the maximum
number of pairs of commuters.
We also plot the distributions of total separation distance
in pick-up locations between pairs of matched commuters
in Fig. 3b. We observe that most matched commuters are
separated by less than 2km in their pick-up locations. We also
notice that over 40% of matched commuters are separated by
over 500m in their pick-up locations and segment-based cost-
sharing mechanism induce the highest percentage of separated
matched commuters (50% over 500m).
B. Stable Matching Structures
Setting: We next study the structures of stable matching
outcomes under different cost-sharing mechanisms. We first
sorted the matched commuters according to the distances of
their standalone rides. In Fig. 4, each commuter is represented
by a point on the perimeter of a circle, following the order
of distances of standalone rides. An edge is drawn between
a pair of matched commuters. We also color the commuters
with long standalone rides by yellow, and the commuters with
short standalone rides by blue.
Observations: In Fig. 4, we visualize the stable match-
ing structures. We observe that different cost-sharing mecha-
nisms induce different stable matching structures. For equal
cost-sharing mechanism, commuters with long standalone
rides are more likely to be matched among themselves,
and so are those with short standalone rides. On the other
hand, for proportional, egalitarian and segment-based cost-
sharing mechanisms, commuters with long standalone rides
are more likely to be matched with those of short standalone
rides. Hence, proportional, egalitarian and segment-based cost-
sharing mechanisms can bolster diversity in stable matching
with heterogeneous commuters of different pick-up and drop-
off locations.
C. Social Optimality
Setting: We next examine the social optimality of different
cost-sharing mechanisms for practical taxi sharing. The study
is based on the data of January 4, 2013 (i.e., Weekday) and
February 23, 2013 (i.e., Weekend) in the NYC taxi trip dataset.
We selected five representative one-hour periods (1-2 am, 8-
9am, 12-1pm, 5-6pm, 9-10pm) on each day. In Fig. 5a, we
compare the social optimality ratios of the social costs over
the costs of social optimal outcomes in the respective periods.
In Fig. 5b, we also compare the social utilities of all matched
commuters (which is the total savings from standalone rides
of all commuters:
∑
i ui =
∑
i ci − pi).
Observations: We observe that the empirical social opti-
mality ratios of four cost-sharing mechanisms (≤ 1.2) are
well below the theoretical upper bound 32 in Sec. VII. Indeed,
the social optimality ratios are much in practice smaller than
the theoretical bounds, and hence, can achieve higher social
optimality. In particular, equal cost-sharing mechanism induce
less social utilities and larger social optimality ratios, whereas
the other three cost-sharing mechanisms produce comparable
results. In terms of social utilities, we observe that all cost-
sharing mechanisms can achieve higher social utilities, when
the social optimal outcome has a higher social utility.
D. Distributions of Normalized Utilities
Setting: To shed light on the individual benefits of matched
commuters, we define the normalized utility of commuter i
by the ratio ci−pici , which is the normalized utility over the
standalone ride cost. In Fig. 6a, we compare the cumulative
distributions of normalized utilities among the matched com-
muters under different cost-sharing mechanisms.
Observations: We observe that the cumulative distributions
of normalized utilities under different cost-sharing mechanism
on weekday and weekend are similar. Comparing the outcomes
of different cost-sharing mechanisms, more commuters have
lower normalized utilities under equal cost-sharing mecha-
nism. The number of commuters who have the highest nor-
malized utilities (0.5) under proportional mechanism is the
largest among the four cost-sharing mechanisms, which is ap-
proximately 15% of total commuters. Thus, proportional cost-
sharing mechanism can benefit commuters with higher normal-
ized savings. Furthermore, proportional and egalitarian cost-
sharing mechanisms induce similar cumulative distributions
of normalized utilities of less than 0.35, whereas proportional
cost-sharing mechanism induces more commuters having the
normalized utilities around 0.4 than egalitarian cost-sharing
mechanism.
9(a) Equal. (b) Proportional. (c) Egalitarian. (d) Segment-based. (e) Social optimum.
Fig. 4: Stable matching structures based on different cost-sharing mechanisms and social optimal outcome. Each commuter is
represented by a point on the perimeter of a circle, following the order of distances of standalone rides. An edge is drawn
between a pair of matched commuters.
(a) Social optimality ratios. (b) Social utilities.
Fig. 5: (a) Social optimality ratios and (a) social utilities based on different cost-sharing mechanisms.
(a) Normalized utilities. (b) Standalone cost ratios.
Fig. 6: Cumulative distributions of (a) normalized utilities ( ci−pici ) and (b) standalone cost ratios
min{ci,cj}
max{ci,cj} under different
cost-sharing mechanisms.
E. Distributions of Standalone Cost Ratios
Setting: Next, we study the similarity between commuters
in a matched pair. We define the standalone cost ratio of a
matched pair of commuters (i, j) by min{ci,cj}max{ci,cj} , which is the
maximum over different standalone ride costs for a pair (i, j).
If min{ci,cj}max{ci,cj} → 1, the matched pair are relatively similar. In
Fig. 6b, we compare the cumulative distributions of standalone
cost ratios among the matched commuters under different cost-
sharing mechanisms.
Observations: The cumulative distributions of standalone
cost ratios under different cost-sharing mechanism on weekday
and weekend commuters are similar. Overall, commuters are
more likely matched with those of similar standalone costs
since more commuters have high standalone cost ratios (>
0.8) in any one of the cost-sharing mechanisms. Its also
worth to notice that approximately 70% of commuters have
high standalone cost ratios (> 0.8) under equal cost-sharing
mechanism, whose percentage is more than that the other
three cost-sharing mechanisms. Egalitarian and segment-based
cost-sharing mechanisms produce the similar cumulative dis-
tributions of standalone cost ratios, whereas proportional cost-
sharing mechanism produces more commuters who have lower
standalone cost ratios than the other cost-sharing mechanisms,
which indicates that commuters are more likely matched with
those of different standalone costs under proportional cost-
sharing mechanism.
F. Distributions of Delay Ratios
Setting: Ride-sharing may incur additional delay to a
commuter because of a detour to pick-up another commuter.
Particularly, we consider the incurred delay in terms of addi-
tional geographical distance in ride-sharing, in the presence of
similar traffic condition. We denote the geographical distances
traveled of a matched pair of commuters i and j in a shared
ride by dii,j and d
i
i,j respectively. We denote the geographical
distance by commuter i in his standalone ride by di. Define
the delay ratio of a matched pair of commuters (i, j) by
max{d
i
i,j
di
,
dji,j
dj
}, which is a natural metric of delay in a shared
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Fig. 7: Cumulative distributions of delay ratios
(max{d
i
i,j
di
,
dji,j
dj
}) under different cost-sharing mechanisms.
ride. In Fig. 7, we compare the cumulative distributions of
delay ratios among the matched commuters under different
cost-sharing mechanisms.
Observations: The cumulative distributions of delay ratios
under different cost-sharing mechanisms on weekday and
weekend are similar. We also notice that the average delay
ratios are around 1.1, and over 90% of matched commuters
have delay ratios less than 1.4. Hence, small delays are
incurred among the matched commuters. Segment-based cost-
sharing mechanism induces more matched commuters hav-
ing lower delay ratio (< 1.1) than other three cost-sharing
mechanisms. In addition, equal and egalitarian cost-sharing
mechanisms produce similar cumulative distributions of delay
ratios, whereas proportional cost-sharing mechanism produce
more matched commuters who have slightly lower delay ratios
than equal and egalitarian cost-sharing mechanisms.
G. Insights and Ramifications
Overall, we draw the following insights and ramifications
based on our empirical study of practical ride-sharing with
New York City taxi trip dataset:
1) The four fair (i.e., equal, egalitarian, proportional and
segment-based) cost-sharing mechanisms can enable ef-
fective decentralized ride-sharing arrangement in practice
by achieving high social optimality, such that the induced
social costs are as comparably low as the social optimal
arrangement by a centralized planner whose objective is
to minimize the total cost.
2) Egalitarian and proportional cost-sharing mechanisms can
induce more matched commuters than equal and segment-
based cost-sharing mechanisms.
3) Egalitarian, proportional and segment-based cost-sharing
mechanisms can bolster diversity among the matched
commuters with heterogeneous locations.
4) Proportional cost-sharing mechanism can benefit com-
muters with higher normalized savings.
5) All four cost-sharing mechanisms incur small delays
among the matched commuters.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Ride-sharing is a popular paradigm in intelligent trans-
portation systems, requiring decentralized decision-making
processes among commuters. This paper offers a thorough
study of decentralized ride-sharing arrangements based on the
principle of fair cost-sharing of transportation costs. We define
several fair cost-sharing mechanisms, including equal, egalitar-
ian, proportional and segment-based cost-sharing mechanisms.
We compare the stable matching outcomes induced by these
cost-sharing mechanisms with a social optimal outcome by
deriving the theoretical bounds of social optimality ratios.
Our results show that these fair cost-sharing mechanisms
can achieve high social optimality. We also corroborate our
results with an empirical study of taxi sharing under fair
cost-sharing mechanisms by a data analysis on New York
City taxi trip dataset. In particular, we observe from our
empirical study that egalitarian and proportional cost-sharing
mechanisms can approach a social optimal outcome, although
all equal, egalitarian, proportional and segment-based cost-
sharing mechanisms share the same theoretical bound of social
optimality ratio.
Apart from the study of social optimality ratio, there are
other potential areas to explore in future work. First, our
theoretical analysis does not consider the shareability network
structure of feasible coalitions. Some network structures may
favor a particular type of cost-sharing mechanism. Second, this
work so far considers transportation cost as the primary factor
of coalition formation. Another possible factor is delay, which
can lead to different coalition structures. Third, we consider
stable matching for ride-sharing with a pair of commuters.
There are other possibilities, for example, with more than
two commuters in each group in shuttle sharing, and between
drivers and passengers, who have asymmetric roles. Also, we
will consider uncertain information (e.g., traffic information)
and unknown arrivals of future commuters in an online fash-
ion, which will require different matching mechanisms.
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APPENDIX
Theorem 2: For egalitarian cost-sharing mechanism, let
Mˆega be a stable ride-sharing assignment. We show that the
social optimality ratio is upper bounded by c(Mˆ
ega)
c(M∗) ≤ 32 .
Proof: Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, suppose (i, j) ∈
Mˆega\M∗. Then there must exist (i, k) and (j, l), such that
(i, k), (j, l) ∈M∗\Mˆega. We also obtain
pegai (Mˆega) + pegaj (Mˆega) + pegak (Mˆega) + pegal (Mˆega)
≤ ci,j + ck + cl (33)
Since Mˆega is a stable ride-sharing assignment, we obtain
ci,j+ci−cj
2 = p
ega
i (Mˆega) ≤ pegai (M∗) = ci,k+ci−ck2
⇒ ci,j + ck ≤ ci,k + cj (34)
ci,j+ci−cj
2 = p
ega
j (Mˆega) ≤ pegaj (M∗) = cj,l+ci−cl2
⇒ ci,j + cl ≤ cj,l + cj (35)
Together, by noting that ci,k ≥ max{ci, ck} and cj,l ≥
max{cj , cl}, we obtain
3
(
pegai (M∗) + pegaj (M∗) + pegak (M∗) + pegal (M∗)
)
= 3(ci,k + cj,l) (36)
≥ ci,k + cj,l + ci + cj + ck + cl (37)
≥ 2(ci,j + ck + cl) (38)
≥ 2(pegai (Mˆega) + pegaj (Mˆega) + pegak (Mˆega) + pegal (Mˆega))
(39)
Therefore, it completes the proof in a similar way as
Theorem 1.
Theorem 3: For proportional cost-sharing mechanism, let
Mˆpp be a stable ride-sharing assignment. We show that the
social optimality ratio is upper bounded by c(Mˆ
pp)
c(M∗) ≤ 32 .
Proof: Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, suppose (i, j) ∈
Mˆpp\M∗. Then there must exist (i, k) and (j, l), such that
(i, k), (j, l) ∈M∗\Mˆpp. We also obtain
pppi (Mˆpp)+pppj (Mˆpp)+pppk (Mˆpp)+pppl (Mˆpp) ≤ ci,j+ck+cl
(40)
Since Mˆpp is a stable ride-sharing assignment, we obtain
ci·ci,j
ci+cj
= pppi (Mˆpp) ≤ pppi (M∗) = ci·ci,kci+ck
⇒ ci,j(ci+ck)ci+cj ≤ ci,k (41)
cj ·ci,j
ci+cj
= pppj (Mˆpp) ≤ pppj (M∗) = cj ·cj,lcj+cl
⇒ ci,j(cj+cl)ci+cj ≤ cj,l (42)
Together, by noting that ci,k ≥ max{ci, ck} and cj,l ≥
max{cj , cl}, we obtain
3
(
pppi (M∗) + pppj (M∗) + pppk (M∗) + pppl (M∗)
)
= 3(ci,k + cj,l) (43)
≥ 2
(ci,j(ci + ck)
ci + cj
+
ci,j(cj + cl)
ci + cj
)
+ ci,k + cj,l (44)
= 1ci+cj (2ci,jci + 2ci,jck + 2ci,jcj + 2ci,jcl (45)
+ ci,kci + ci,kcj + cj,lci + cj,lcj) (46)
≥ 1ci+cj (2ci,jci + 2ci,jck + 2ci,jcj + 2ci,jcl (47)
+ ckci + ckcj + clci + clcj) (48)
≥ 1ci+cj (2ci,jci + cick + cjck + 2ci,jcj + cicl + cjcl (49)
+ ckci + ckcj + clci + clcj) (50)
≥ 2(ci,j + ck + cl) (51)
≥ 2(pppi (Mˆpp) + pppj (Mˆpp) + pppk (Mˆpp) + pppl (Mˆpp))
(52)
Therefore, it completes the proof in a similar way as
Theorem 1.
Theorem 4: For segment-based cost-sharing mechanism, let
Mˆsb be a stable ride-sharing assignment. We show that the
social optimality ratio is upper bounded by c(Mˆ
sb)
c(M∗) ≤ 32 .
Proof: Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, suppose (i, j) ∈
Mˆsb\M∗. Then there must exist (i, k) and (j, l), such that
(i, k), (j, l) ∈M∗\Mˆsb. We also obtain
psbi (Mˆsb)+psbj (Mˆsb)+psbk (Mˆsb)+psbl (Mˆsb) ≤ ci,j+ck+cl
(53)
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Next, according to segment-based cost-sharing mechanism,
each commuter i contributes equally to the cost of the seg-
ments he participates in. Let ci,k(vsk, v
d
k) be the cost from
the k’s source location to k’s destination location in the
sharable ride for (i, k). Note that ci,k(vsk, v
d
k) ≥ c(rselfk ) = ck.
Otherwise, the commuter k can always choose another lower
cost standalone trip rselfk . We consider two cases:
• If (i, k) share a hitchhiking ride, then
psbk (M∗) ≥
ci,k(v
s
k, v
d
k)
2
≥ ck
2
(54)
• If (i, k) share a combined ride, then
psbk (M∗) ≥min
{
ci,k(v
s
k, v
s
i ) +
ci,k(v
s
i ,v
d
k)
2 ,
ci,k(v
s
k,v
d
i )
2 + ci,k(v
d
i , v
d
k)
}
(55)
≥ ci,k(vsk,vdk)2 ≥ ck2 (56)
Hence, we obtain psbk (M∗) ≥ ck2 and similarly psbl (M∗) ≥ cl2 .
since Mˆsb is a stable ride-sharing assignment, we obtain
psbk (Mˆsb) ≤ ck, psbl (Mˆsb) ≤ cl (57)
Together, by noting that ci,k ≥ max{ci, ck} and cj,l ≥
max{cj , cl}, we obtain
3
(
psbi (M∗) + psbj (M∗) + psbk (M∗) + psbl (M∗)
)
≥ 2(psbi (M∗) + psbj (M∗) + ck2 + cl2 )+ ci,k + cj,l (58)
≥ 2(ci,j + ck2 + cl2 ) + ck + cl (59)
≥ 2(psbi (Mˆsb) + psbj (Mˆsb) + psbk (Mˆsb) + psbl (Mˆsb))
(60)
Therefore, it completes the proof in a similar way as
Theorem 1.
